

Contents

About this book	7
1 Preliminaries	15
1.1 The problem of <i>de se</i> sentences	15
1.2 Notational conventions and Intensional Logic	17
1.3 Overview	18
PART 1	21
2 Lewis in a nutshell	23
2.1 The basic idea: Properties and instead of propositions	23
2.2 Logical relations	25
2.3 Intensionality	27
3 An Alternative: Propositions behind the scene	29
3.1 Centered Propositions	29
3.2 Centering replaced by individual concepts	30
3.3 Some consequences for notation and implementation	33
4 The world is not enough	35
4.1 Rudolf Lingens and the library of facts	35
4.2 Mad Heimson and identity	38
4.3 Two gods and omniscience	41
5 Independent evidence in favor of properties?	43
5.1 Oneiric reference	43
5.2 Quantification	47
6 <i>De se</i> versus <i>de re</i>	50
6.1 Concept Generators	50
6.2 Acquaintance as a <i>de se</i> relation and as identity	52
6.3 On the independence of <i>de re</i> and <i>de se</i>	55
6.4 Bare <i>de re</i>	57
7 Characters	59
7.1 Montague and Kaplan	59

7.2	Stalnaker	61
8	Identification and Selves across attitudes	64
8.1	Centered attitudes	64
8.2	Identification and Identity	66
PART 2		69
9	Introduction	71
9.1	Rigid reference to the Self	71
9.2	What's next on the agenda?	72
10	Identity statements	74
10.1	Stipulated counter-identity (1)	74
10.2	Contextually relevant properties	76
10.3	Contextually relevant descriptions	76
10.4	Naming without necessity	77
11	Introducing epistemic models	79
11.1	Subjective meanings	79
11.1.1	A brief digression into model theoretical semantics	79
11.1.2	The semantics of <i>believe</i> and rigid designation	81
11.1.3	Epistemic models, misidentification, and the Self	82
11.2	Misnaming and substitution of names	83
11.3	Private "I" vs. public person	86
12	Quantification and neutralization	90
12.1	Epistemic propositions, x_S -reductions, and truth	91
12.2	x_S -reductions and neutral readings	96
12.3	<i>Only</i> and numbers	97
13	Epistemic propositions across subjects	99
13.1	Identity of propositions across models	99
13.2	Identity of properties across models	101
13.3	Ellipsis and Logical Form	104

14 Groundedness	106
15 Related issues	109
15.1 Relation between “I” and <i>he</i> *	109
15.2 Omniscience	109
15.3 Narrow disjunction	111
15.4 Stipulated counter-identity (2)	111
16 Summary	112
References	115
Index of Names	121